• (A) If God were to exist, then he would possess all of the following four properties (among others):
• (1) being able to bring about situation L, all things considered;
• (2) wanting to bring about situation L, i.e., having it among his desires;
• (3) not wanting anything else that conflicts with his desire to bring about situation L as strongly as it;
• (4) being rational (which implies always acting in accord with his own highest purposes).
• (B) If a being who has all four properties listed above were to exist, then situation L would have to obtain.
• (C) But situation L does not obtain. The amount of suffering and unfairness in the world at the present time is not significantly less than what it actually is at present.
• (D) Therefore [from (B) & (C)], there does not exist a being who has all four properties listed in premise (A).
• (E) Hence [from (A) & (D)], God does not exist. ¹

Philosophers who are aware of various historical theodicies understand that much of the tension between the existence of God and the existence of evil center around Epicurus' famous presentation of the logical problem of evil.⁴ Fortunately for contemporary defenders of classic theism, the logical problem of evil is no longer a penetrating issue in academia. Instead, philosophers have now conceded that the logical problem of evil is no longer a successful criticism of theism.⁵ I fervently desiderate that further research in this field will reflect this. Permit me to begin by addressing those premises in Drange's argument that I find acceptable. First, it does not strike me as too controversial to accept premise (A2) since God, as an omnibenevolent being, would certainly have within His heart a profound desire to see all persons have their suffering and premature mortality reduced. And this is not idle philosophical speculation since the New Testament has already made it clear that:

The Lord is not slow in keeping his promise, as some understand slowness. He is patient with you, not wanting anyone to perish, but everyone to come to repentance (2 Peter 3:9; NIV; emphasis mine).

I. CONSIDERING ALL THINGS

Drange suggests that God is able to bring about a situation such that "the amount of suffering and premature death experienced by humans in the world at the present time being significantly less than what it actually is at present. (In other words, if the actual amount, at present, is, say, a total of n units of suffering and premature death, then in situation L that amount would be, at present, significantly less than n units."⁷ Premise (A1) supposes that God can bring about this situation "all things considered." One way in which Drange supposes that this can be achieved is "for him to have made the earth a calmer and more stable planet, with much fewer storms, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. Then there would not occur so much suffering and premature death as a consequence of such natural catastrophes."

Although there is a ring of truth about this (that God is capable of instantiating anything that is not logically impossible for Him to do), Drange's premise hinges on the misunderstanding between what it means to have a possible world versus what it means to have a feasible world. With respect to the logical possibility of a world where situation L is true, we must concede Drange's presumption here. There is nothing self-contradictory or illogical about God actualizing a world where less evil occurs in order to bring about the same good. I certainly can at least conceive of such a world. So the question of God's existence will not be solved by appealing to logical impossibility. Now what about the notion of feasibility about there being a world in which natural disasters are reduced with respect to the amount the actual world contains? A world is said to be feasible for God if such a world is possible and can be successfully brought about. Notice that we would not be interested in what is merely possible for God. But there are reasons to think that God cannot bring about an unfeasible world (without advocating the Eastern tradition that surmises that God can bring about logical contradictions, or falling into a voluntarism of the Scotian type). Consider the following counterfactual statements logically possible for Ivan to perform:

1. If Ivan were in situation S then, possibly, he would enroll in Philosophy 101

2. If Ivan were in situation S then, possibly, he would not enroll in Philosophy 101.

3. Under no circumstances will Ivan enroll in Philosophy 101.

4. God cannot determine a causal agent to bring about freely a specific action.

5. All possible worlds for God where situation L is feasible are underpopulated.

6. It is not feasible for God to create a world with as much good in it without as much evil as the actual world has.

II. THE INDISCERPTIBLE DESIRES OF GOD

Classical theism has generally held to the following primary attributes prescribed to God: God is (a) personal; (b) omnibenevolent; (c) omnipotent; (d) omniscient; (e) transcendent; and (f) a necessary being. Drange's contention in proving the nonexistence of God concerns the difficulty of reconciling the truths of (b) and (c) with the reality of the actual world since the actual world could possibly contain less evil and suffering than what is currently present. We have already seen how (a) and (c) are logically compatible with the actual world in which we live. But, more fundamentally, I have to call premise (A3) on God's desires into question for it does not take into account the entirety of God's inseparable desires. Drange writes:

It might be thought that since God is omnipotent, he cannot have conflicting desires. The term 'conflicts' in premise (A3) conveys the idea that it would have been impossible even for God to satisfy both desires simultaneously. But for God, nothing is impossible. Hence, he cannot have such conflicting desires, which makes premise (A3) automatically true. ⁹

In a similar vein, the classic theist can survive Drange's awkward attack here by merely positing the following possibility:

7. God's greatest desire is to bring all human beings to salvation.¹¹

III. CONCLUSION

Dr. Drange has raised some important issues in the consistency of God's attributes with respect to His omnibenevolence and His omnipotence. He has argued against God's existence on the basis of a logically possible world where the same good exists but with lesser evil. As I have argued, there is no way to determine if such a world is feasible for God to create given the stubborn factor of created freedom. Secondly, Drange has attempted to disprove God's existence on the basis of reducing evil being the highest desire of God. But we have seen no good reason to think this, because Drange has wrongly assumed that the highest desire of God is amelioration and not the desire to see all persons saved. Furthermore, he has clearly proposed a false assumption in his argument because it is not true that God cannot have conflicting desires. Therefore, classic theists have no good reason to reject the existence of God on the basis of Drange's Argument from Evil.

END NOTES

1. T. Drange, “Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief” (http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/theodore_drange/aeanb.html).

2. Nonbelief and Evil: Two Arguments for the Existence of God</i> (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998)

3. Drange is careful to point out that a portion of his Argument from Evil serves instrumentally as the backdrop to his more belabored Argument
from Nonbelief.

Specifically, the premise that he finds the most controversial is the one that suggests that God does not want anything
more than to actualize His desire to bring about a possible world where unacceptable conditions are reduced. He writes:

Since the argument is valid, the only way to attack it would be at one of its premises. And the one which I think is most vulnerable would be premise (A3). That is all I shall say about AE in this essay. I present it here only as background material for the discussion of ANB, which I regard to be the stronger of the two arguments.

(Drange, “Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief”).

The Argument from Nonbelief concerns the nonexistence of God based on the idea that God is able and would desire to bring about a specific possible world. This possible world (W)is such that all persons are aware that God exists, that He loves humanity, and that He has provided humanity with an afterlife. Because W is one that entails the desire of God to maximize a world where all persons come to believe in Him, He would bring it about that all persons actually would come to believe in Him.Due to the prematurity of death and the pervasive evil that exists, Drange suggests that such a situation envisaged W by is perturbed and is not instantiated as the actual world (W*). Given the alleged moral necessity impressed upon by God’s attributes, we are supposed to see:

<.>(W-->W*)

Although a thorough criticism of the Argument from Nonbelief is certainly beyond the scope of this article, a swift refutation of its modal necessity can be noted. One of what renders the necessity of W* from W false based on the premises of the Arguments from Evil and Nonbelief is that there deficit of amelioration and belief. We shall discuss the overriding desires over amelioration in the Argument from Evil’s relevant premise in this article.But, with respect to the Argument from Nonbelief, there is no reason to think that God would have the overriding desire to inform the entire populace of His existence if it is possible that either (a) such persons would never respond affirmatively if they heard of Him, or (b) such persons would not invest their hearts and souls to Him if they heard of Him. Such a world where these overriding desires exist ender the following possibility:

<>(Wo --> ~W)

such that detractors to Drange can properly acknowledge:

<>(Wo -->[`<>(W-->W*)])

The detractor need not commit herself to believing either (a) or (b); she need only accept that (a) and (b) are possible existent desires that would override God's desire to inform an entire populace of His existence.

4. For a recapitulation of Epicurus’ statement, see David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Henry D. Aiken (New York: Hafner, 1948), p. 64. Hume's essay with which this quote belongs is also cited in M. Peterson, W. Hasker, B. Reichenbach, and D. Basinger, Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 260.

5. Peter Van Inwagen, "The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence," Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5: Philosophy of Religion, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing, 1991), p. 135; Alvin Plantinga, "Tooley and Evil: A Reply," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1981): 74; William Alston, "The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition," in Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5, p. 29.

6. I should say that much of the present-day research concerning finely tuned antecedent conditions necessary for the existence of Homo sapiens on earth are coming not just from teleological theists but from the mainstream of the astrophysical sciences. See John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); P.C.W. Davies, The Physics of Time Asymmetry (London: Surrey University Press, 1974); Robert Jastrow, God and the Astronomers (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978); William Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science & Theology (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1999).

7. Drange, "Arguments from Evil"

8. See Ed L. Miller, Questions that Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy, 3^rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1992), pp. 401-407. Determinism in its own right evinces a world where causal agents act in such a way that they could not have done otherwise. These determined outcomes are the result of antecedent causes. Regardless whether one makes the distinction between hard determinism and soft determinism, the theological determinist cannot escape the inevitable reduction from the soft to the hard.  All actions would be the result of either antecedent external causes or antecedent internal causes; but they are not the result of an exercise of the free will nonetheless.

9. Drange, "Arguments from Evil"

10. To see how the Christian ethic envisages such conflicting scenarios and how such an ethical system conjoins various rules in moral decision-making, see Scott B. Rae, Moral Choices: An Introduction to Ethics (Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1995), pp. 99-116.The Christian ethic is permeated with the need to override ethical principles with weightier ones.

11. See 1 Timothy 2:4; 2 Peter 3:9.