Ninian Smart approaches the problem in a different manner. Rather than trying to use ineffability to define the mystical experience, he defines ineffability, and then attempts to show why it is that the mystical experience is ineffable. Unlike Stace, Smart leaves the subject/object division in tact, and puts more emphasis on the object of the experience which makes it mystical than how it is experienced. Smart's notion of ineffability, as we shall see, appears to be closely related to that of A. E. Taylor's. Taylor writes, "The word worship, like all the other words, is really hopelessly inadequate to express the attitude a man experiences in the presence of what he feels to be the 'absolute otherness.'" ⁽²³⁾

By leaving the subject/object split in tact, Smart hopes to show that it is not the experience itself which is ineffable, but rather the object. Smart writes,

To say that God is incomprehensible may be to say not that he is utterly incomprehensible but that he is not totally comprehensible. There would seem to be a contradiction in saying that he is utterly incomprehensible - thus nothing could be known about him including anything that might form a basis for referring to him as God. ⁽²⁴⁾

This break with Stace is telling. Under Stace's definitions it was the experience itself which was ineffable, and this we saw, left no room to say that the mystic had accessed any form of knowledge. The experience itself was indescribable. Smart, on the other hand, like Taylor, claims that the experience of the mystic is not what is indescribable, but the other which she encounters during the experience. What makes the experience mystical is not the experience itself, but rather the object of the experience. Ineffability applies to the object, and not to the experience.

With this broad definition of ineffability, Smart breaks it down into three kinds:

1) The object is greater than the words used to describe it.

2) The object cannot be depicted by ordinary adjectives.

3) The object is sheer bliss. ⁽²⁵⁾

These three types might present to us a truer reading of what it is that James had in mind in his original definition of ineffability. After all, James claimed no adequate description could be given to the content of the experience, not the experience itself. In this sense, Smart could well be putting us on the right track, at least according to this reading of James.

Moreover, there seems to be nothing about the types of ineffability which Smart describes which would keep us from saying that the mystic has a claim to knowledge. This knowledge, however, would be knowledge by acquaintance, and not propositional knowledge. This, in and of itself, does not seem too troubling.

But, what is troubling is that the clearer picture we get of ineffability with Smart, the farther we get from understanding what separates the mystical experience from other types of experiences. For instance, one gazing at the art work in the Sistine Chapel might have an experience which parallels 1). Such an experience might also fall under the type 2) experience. And, what of one experiencing a sexual orgasm? Might that not fall under type 3)? Would these two types of experiences, however, properly be called mystical? Even under a broad definition of a mystical experience, such as James's it would be hard to believe that these are the types of experiences which are summoned to mind as mystical. That is not to say that they could not be, but then there would be little left that was unique about the mystical experience, Further, we could no longer say that the mystical experience, in the truest sense, gives us insight into the depths of truth. We would loose, to some degree, the claim to noetic knowledge which characterizes the mystical experience.

Perhaps it is in recognition of this problem that Smart writes the following:

...[T]hat philosophizing must rest here upon a reasonable knowledge of the empirical question, though as in other inquiries that are conceptual issues too. These are thus severe limitations upon the philosophical discussion of mysticism in the abstract. The comparative study of religion thus becomes an indispensable basis of the philosophy of religion. ⁽²⁶⁾

But to say this is tantamount to saying that what counts as a mystical experience and what is not is dependent on doctrine and not on experience. Therefore, whether any depths of truth were revealed would be a matter of doctrinal interpretation, and not something gained from the experience. In this sense, then, we would be speaking of truth in a weak sense, and not of truth in a strong sense, a sense of being grasped by the intellect. Ninian Smart's account, therefore, cannot be seen as successful in the sense which we set forth in the beginning.

V. Conclusion

Through the course of this discussion, we have sought relief from the dilemma of how a mystical experience can be ineffable and be noetic. What we have seen as that when the definition of what ineffable meant was tightened, any claim to knowledge would have to fall by the wayside. On the contrary, when the definition of ineffable was loosened, would could account for knowledge gained from such an experience, but we were unable to tell a mystical experience apart from another type of experience on the grounds of the experience alone. We needed doctrinal help. The mystical experiences, therefore, are not to be seen as unique on their own account.

With all this having been said, it is hard to see how our investigation has given us any new insight into the nature of mystical experience. Yet, there is insight to be gained. What this shows us is what we do know about the experience. Without this knowledge, this critique would not have been possible. It is because of this knowledge that we see what work is left to be done.

While not within the scope of this paper, it might be possible to place a further condition on the mystical experience above and beyond the factors of ineffability and noesis. The clue left for us is to be found in both James and Smart. It is perhaps by looking at the content, or object, of the mystical experience that we might finally be able to successfully determine what is a mystical experience and what is not, and also have a clearer indication what, if any, depths of truths are revealed by such experiences.

This would not mean, however, that we would have to fall into the disguise of perennialists and claim that all objects of religious experience must be essentially the same. Rather it might be possible to construct a list from the experiences themselves, concerning what the objects are. This list may, or may not, in the end, meet any doctrinal requirements. Perhaps this would be the needed catalyst that might finally serve to offer relief from the problem of the ineffability of mystical experience.

Endnotes

23. A. E. Taylor, excerpt from "The Vindication of Religion" reprinted in The Existence of God, ed. John Hick, (McMillian, 1964), p. 160.

24. Ninian Smart, "Understanding Religious Experience" in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven Katz, (Oxford, 1978) p. 17.

25. Ninian Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs, (University of California Press, 1996) p. 43. See also, Ninian Smart, "Understanding Religious Experience" in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven Katz, (Oxford, 1978) pp. 18-19.

26. Ninian Smart, "Understanding Religious Experience" in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Steven Katz, (Oxford, 1978) p. 15.