Success, for the purposes of this paper, will be met when and if a definition of ineffability can be found that 1) allows for the mystical experience to be noetic, and 2) such a definition can be used as a defining characteristic of the mystical experience. The former will give us a way to say that the mystical experience, while ineffable, can still be grasped by the intellect in a meaningful way. The importance of the latter tells us whether any experience which is characterized as being ineffable can have any other characteristics which represent the experience directly. For if it is the case that the mystical experience is ineffable, in the sense that it is not describable, then it cannot be the case that any other characteristic which is attributed to the experience, such as noetic, can directly represent the experience. At the most, such a characteristic can only be an indirect description, and not a defining one.

This study has serious implications for the philosophical investigation of mysticism. In order for anything meaningful to be said about a mystical experience, it must needs be that the experience can be related in a manner which is meaningful. This means that the mystic herself must understand the experience, and that what the mystic says about the experience must have meaning. Yet, if the mystical experience is ineffable in the sense that it is indescribable, then it is hard to imagine how either of those conditions can be met. It is this tension between understanding of mystical experience and ineffability of the mystical experience for which philosophers of mysticism seek relief, and our purposes here is to see if there is indeed any relief in sight.

II. Preliminary Considerations

James left for those who followed him a paradox. His definitions of ineffability and noesis appear to contradict one another. By looking merely at the definitions which he provides for us, it would seem that one who had an ineffable experience cannot have a noetic experience. For James, an experience is said to be ineffable when it "defies expression, that no adequate report of its content can be given in words. . . . that it follows that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others." And a noetic experience is one which he defines as "although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. . . . states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect." ⁽³⁾

The obvious problem here is that if truth is a quality found in language, specifically propositions, then it cannot be the case that truth can be had without linguistic expression, specifically a meaningful propositional expression. As A. J. Ayer put it, "If a mystic admits that the object of his vision is something which cannot be described, then he must also admit that he is bound to talk nonsense when he describes it....[I]n describing his vision, the mystic does not give us any information about the external world; he merely gives us indirect information about his own mind." ⁽⁴⁾

This problem cuts directly to the relief sought by philosophers of mysticism. If the mystical experience cannot be expressed because it is ineffable, then nothing about the experience can be put into language and no truth can be had (about what is claimed to be experienced). On the other hand, those who have had a mystical experience claim to have knowledge gained about what they experienced, and they communicate that knowledge in prolific fashion. There is no shortage of mystical literature which impart "truth" gained from mystical experiences. Because of this fact, it would seem that mystical experience cannot be ineffable. If they were, then there would be no writings left by mystics, let alone writings which claim to impart the truth gained from the experience ⁽⁵⁾. Forcing this point, William Alston asserts the following:

These repeated asseverations [that the mystics have stated their experiences are indescribable] have led James to include ineffability among his four distinguishing marks of mysticism. Nevertheless, I feel that this is blown out of all proportion. Despite statements like those...[the] subjects manage to say quite a lot about their experiences and about what they take themselves to be experiencing.....In the face of all this one can hardly take literally the claim that the experiences are ineffable. I believe that such claims are at best taken as denials that the experience can be specified literally in terms taken from common experience, so that recourse must be had to metaphor, analogy, symbols and so on, if one is to give a detailed account. But that is a situation in which we not uncommonly find ourselves when dealing with matters that fall outside the range of common experience, whether in science, religion, or philosophy. It is by no means peculiar to mystical experience. ⁽⁶⁾

If Alston is correct, and one must resort to metaphors, analogies and so on to describe an experience, then isn't he merely stating what James claimed ineffability is? To be forced, not by choice, to relate an experience by means of metaphor, analogy and symbols, would seem to imply, as Alston points out that words taken from common experience are not adequate to capture (literally) the experience. Alston denies James's claim by covertly agreeing with him. But, the overall point is not lost. It is ironic in the least, and paradoxical in the most, that mystics do write so much about their experiences which they claim to be ineffable. It is, as Alston says, hard to take the claim that such experiences are ineffable seriously.

But this leads us to a more serious problem. If it is the case that the mystical experience can only be captured by metaphor, analogy and symbolism, because they are ineffable, then this means that no other term can be used to define the mystical experience other than ineffability. To claim that there could be other terms to define the experience would be to claim that the mystic does not have to resort to metaphor, analogy, and symbolism to express their experience. This means that if it is the case that mystical experiences are ineffable, then it is only the claim that they are ineffable which can be taken literally. This would mean that a mystical experience would be an ineffable experience. But this, Alston warns us, is not uncommon. Therefore, we must find some way to differentiate between the mystical experience and the ineffable experience. Or do we?

Does one have a mystical experience when she cannot find the words to express her gratitude when another performs a kind gesture? ⁽⁷⁾ Does one have an mystical experience when she looks at a cloud formation and cannot find the words to express the formation? ⁽⁸⁾ Are we willing to call such experiences, since they are beyond expression, mystical? According to James they are not mystical because they do not give the one having the experience a insight into the depths of truth. They do not met the qualification of noesis which he claims pertains to the mystical experience. But, as we have just seen, the only defining characteristic of the mystical experience is ineffability, and noesis can only be an indirect description at best. Therefore, the mystical experience would be the ineffable experience, and it would not matter whether the experience was noetic or not. Ineffability would have to be the sole defining characteristic of the mystical experience. Ironic as it may seem, the defining characteristic of the mystical experience states that it cannot be defined.

This affects our considerations in the following manner: if ineffability is the only defining characteristic of the mystical experience, then a mystical experience must be synonymous with an ineffable experience. Therefore, any ineffable experience would be a mystical one. This causes another serious problem for us. At what point is, or what type of, experience is ineffable?

The offered solution to this problem, as we shall see, has been to classify different types of ineffability and to claim that the mystical experience is that of a certain type(s); and that these types have characteristics about themselves which allow us to distinguish between what might be called an ordinary experience which is indescribable and a mystical experience. Further, these types of ineffability themselves have characteristics as to allow for knowledge to be gained from the experience, even though such knowledge not might be literally expressible in language. Again, the question that concerns us, however, is whether these attempts are successful in the sense that they allow the experience itself to be indescribable while at the same time allowing the mystic to gain a state of knowledge. This would satisfy what James tells us about the mystical experience. But, can a satisfactory definition of ineffability be found?

III. Stace's Types of Ineffable Experience and their Difficulties

The challenge of finding a suitable definition for ineffability is two fold: 1) to allow for the differentiation between mystical experiences and other types of ineffable experiences; and 2) for the definition of those types of ineffable experiences which also mystical to be inclusive enough to include all of the varying claims which mystics themselves have made about their experiences. The latter of these challenges has proved to be far more troublesome than the former because of the wide diversity of experiences which fall under the auspices of mystical. ⁽⁹⁾ The former challenge, however, has been undertaken by two notable philosophers of mysticism, Walter Stace and Ninian Smart. We shall begin by looking at the definitions given by Stace.

Walter Stace undertook the challenges stated above in two groundbreaking works: Mysticism and Philosophy ⁽¹⁰⁾ and Time and Eternity ⁽¹¹⁾. In the former, Stace defines two types of mystical experience, the extrovertive and the introvertive which both have ineffability as one of their characteristics, and in the latter, Stace defines different types of ineffability. It is the latter with which we are most concerned.

Richard Gale, in "Mysticism and Philosophy" extracts for us four different definitions which Stace gives us for "ineffability" in Time and Eternity. The definitions, Gale claims, are based on Stace's thesis that "mystical experiences, unlike all other types of experience, are completely ineffable, or non-conceptualizable." The types of ineffability pertaining to the mystical experience are as follows:

1) Within the mystical experience there is an undifferentiated unity, affording no foothold for any concept.

2) Mystical experiences are unique, being totally different from all other types of experience.

3) Propositions describing mystical experiences contain self-contradictions.

4) Propositions describing mystical experiences contradict propositions describing non-mystical experiences.

Stace's types here attempt to show us how it is that he believes the ineffability of the mystical experience is unlike other types of more common ineffable experiences. For while one might not find adequate words to describe a cloud formation, or deepest sense of gratitude, such experiences still allow for differentiation between the subject and the object of the experience, and such experiences (for the most part) do not contain self-contradictions. ⁽¹²⁾ We will look at each of these types separately, first.

In 1), Stace tells us that within the mystical experience itself, the mystic dissolves into the experience. It is the ego that is dissolved. This is not to say, as it could be taken, that claiming "undifferentiated unity" is a concept had within the experience, but rather a concept applied post experience. During the experience itself, there are no conceptual "footholds." But there are still grave concerns for Stace's definition here. Among the most pressing, Gale writes:

Whether the mystic actually experiences the dissolution of the ego is open to some doubts, for how would it be possible for the mystic to remember that he had such an experience? In what sense could it be said to be his experience? How can someone experience the dissolution of the ego? But even if we waive the difficulties and grant Professor Stace his point that there actually is such a dissolution of the personal ego, this would have no logical relevance to the claim that mystical experiences are ineffable in some unique sense. ⁽¹³⁾

This claim is a strong one. If it were indeed that the mystic's experience was such that the subject/object differentiation was truly lost, then in what sense could the mystical experience be said to be an experience at all? If there is truly undifferentiated unity, then there can be no experience, because there would be no experiencee, nor object of the experience. This is a serious difficulty for Stace's first claim about the mystical experience.

But the problems for 1) do not end there. Another serious problem is that 1) is false across the variety of mystical experience. If it is indeed the case that in order to have a mystical, ineffable experience, then numerous celebrated mystics would have to be left out. Julian of Norwich, Teresa of Avila both recount mystical experiences were the sense of self-hood is left fully in tact ⁽¹⁴⁾. To this, Alston points out, "...experiences taken by their subjects to direct awareness of God do not typically exhibit, even phenomenologically, any such absolute unity; and even when they do, this can be seen as an extreme case of a union with God that more usually allows a consciousness of the interpersonal relationship." ⁽¹⁵⁾ To this point, some of the experiences described by Christian mystics do not tell of undifferentiated unity of the type which Stace is asserting, but rather a sexual union, where the individual soul is united with God in the way that two lovers are. ⁽¹⁶⁾ While there may be a union in the sense that "the two become one" in sexual sense, they are certainly not describing the type of undifferentiated as would be required by Stace. Bluntly, if such a unity were to be the case, then the sexual connotation would be that of masturbation, and not of love making.

The problems with 2) are more subtle. And indeed, taken at face value the proposition could be taken to be intuitively true. It would seem unlikely that any experience with the spiritual world could have anything in common with the physical world. Yet, this proposition as well suffers serious flaws. William Alston has written extensively about how the mystical experience is analogous to sensual experience. In fact, he sees this as essential to support the epistemic claims of the mystic. ⁽¹⁷⁾ More directly to the heart of the matter, Stace's proposition overlooks one central characteristic of the mystical experience and that is that mystics themselves use analogies which tie their experiences to common experiences. Such mystics are of course partaking in the cataphatic tradition of mystical experience, and their retelling of the experience is considerably different from those who describe their experiences in the apophatic tradition, but there is a connection, nonetheless, for these mystics and common experience. It would seem, therefore, that Stace's proposition flies in the face of what some mystics themselves tell of their experiences. ⁽¹⁸⁾

The basis for Stace's claim, however, was the contention that some mystics claim that they cannot find adequate words to describe their experience (ala James). Yet, if this is all that Stace means by mystical experiences being unique, then it is a trivial claim, and the same could be said for ordinary experiences which one has which is wholly unlike other experiences. In addition to this point, Richard Gale indicts Stace's claim with the following:

There is something woefully inconsistent in Professor Stace's saying, in one breath, that mystical experiences are ineffable - that no concepts can be used to describe them - and, in the next breath, that there is unanimity in among mystics - that all mystics describe their experiences in pretty much the same way. ⁽¹⁹⁾

This charge is similar to the one which we made earlier. If it is the case that mystical experiences are truly ineffable, in the sense which James uses it, and how Stace uses it here, then it can hardly be the case that any other word can stand as a defining characteristic. Gale's claim here, however, is more narrow. It cannot be the case, that if mystics are truly enjoined in an ineffable experience that they can describe their experience in the same way other than to say they are ineffable. This is hardly enough to claim that mystics describe their experiences in "pretty much the same way", any more than to say that seeing a horrible accident, and seeing a child brought into the world are the same merely because they both involve seeing. To claim that there is anything more to it than that would be to say that indeed concepts do play a role in the mystical experience; and this, of course, Stace denied in 1).

Stace's type 3) suffers from the same problem we found in 1). At best, such a definition can only apply to the apophatic tradition were the mystic uses negative terminology to describe his experience of the divine. Yet, this overlooks the fact that mystics of the cataphatic tradition, while at the same time claiming that words do not adequately describe their experience, do discuss their experience in positive terms and without contradiction. One would have to have a very narrow definition of what a mystical experience is to agree with Stace's definition here.

This problem is only echoed and exasperated in 4). Again, the cataphatic tradition does not contradict propositions of non-mystical experiences. In fact, such experiences make use of the same language as one would find in reading about experiences of the ordinary type in that they describe emotional attitudes, physical sensations, and sequential orders of events. It is not clear why Stace seeks to overlook these types of mystical experiences, but one can be sure that he is based upon his thesis mentioned above, and his desire to support perennial philosophy. If this is the case, however, the Stace's case is non sequitur. It does not follow that because many mystics describe their experiences as ineffable and paradoxical that they are indeed having the same experience. ⁽²⁰⁾

To this, it might be objected that Stace is not trying to capture every mystical experience in each definition, but rather giving us different types of ineffability that the mystic may encounter from their experience. The problem is, however, if this is the case, that there is still a large number of mystical experiences which would be excluded from what Stace would allow. For instance, the notable mystic St. Teresa claims to have an indescribable experience of the mystical variety, but her claim does not appear to meet any of Stace's requirements of ineffability. She writes:

...[A]lthough God seems at that moment very far from the soul, He sometimes reveals his grandeur to it in the strangest way imaginable. This way is indescribable; and I do not think that anyone could believe or understand it who has not already experienced it. ⁽²¹⁾

What Teresa is describing, is no doubt both mystical and ineffable, but it does not appear to share any characteristic singled out by Stace. This is just one example we could give among many which would serve to show that Stace's types of ineffability offered are wholly inadequate to capture what ineffability means to the mystical experience. ⁽²²⁾

But even if we were to allow that Stace's definitions of ineffability were comprehensive of the mystical experience, could they still meet our qualification of successful? Do these definitions allow for the mystic to stake a claim on knowledge? This is a question that is substantially lacking in Stace's types. It would be difficult to say the least, and impossible to say the most, to understand how any knowledge could be had without conceptualization. More than that, if type 3) applied, any knowledge had would contradict itself, which would be tantamount to no knowledge at all. To say that an experience, even a mystical one, is unique as in 2), is not really a claim to knowledge, but rather a claim about the type of experience itself. This too could not supply the mystic with knowledge. And the final type 4) only states that the mystical experience will contradict experiences of the non-mystical variety, but this is vague, and does not give us any direct illumination on what type of knowledge, if any, would be gained from such an experience.

So Stace does not offer us any true relief from the tension which the problem suffers. Not only are his types exclusive to their detriment, but they also do not give us any insight as to how an ineffable experience might allow for knowledge. In fact, in at least type 1) and 3), it would appear that no knowledge at all is possible from such experiences. What Stace has attempted to provide, in the end, is not how knowledge might be gained from such experiences, or even if any is, but rather knowledge about the experience itself. Stace's attempt to demonstrate how it is that types of ineffability serve as the defining characteristic of the mystical experience fail.

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Endnotes

1. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 293. James also states two characteristics of lesser importance, those being transiency and passivity .

2. The reader should keep in mind that the mystical experience is generally considered a subset of the religious experience, though some have sought to say that all religious experiences are mystical. For clarification on this point, see Ninian Smart considers this type of ineffability in "Understanding Religious Experience" in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, Steven Katz, ed. (Oxford, 1978), p.13 and Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God (Clarendon University Press, 1957), pp.248 -253.

3. James, p. 293

4. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (Dover, 1952), pp. 118 -119.

5. Consider the words related by Meister Eckhart: "Where the creature stops, there God begins to be. Now God wants no more from you than that you should in creaturely fashion go out of yourself, and let God be God in you. The smallest creaturely image that ever forms in you is as great as God is great." Meister Eckhart, "Selected Sermons," in Meister Eckhart, ed. Edmund Colledge & Bernard McGinn (Paulist, 1981) p. 184. Here Eckhart is clearly relating what we shall later see falls into a type of ineffable experience, but he is also making declarations of truth.

6. William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, {Cornell, 1991) p.32.

7. Ninian Smart considers this type of ineffability in "Understanding Religious Experience" in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, Steven Katz, ed. (Oxford, 1978), p.18, and in Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs, (University of California, 1996), p. 8.

8. Richard Gale discusses this sense of ineffability in "Mysticism and Philosophy" reprinted in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, eds. Steven M. Cahn & David Shatz, (Oxford, 1982) p. 116. He uses the example of a composer who states that words cannot be a substitute for the direct experience of hearing his music.

9. Denise Lardner Carmody & John Tully Carmody, Mysticism: Holiness East and West, (Oxford, 1996), p. 6.

10. Walter Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, (Macmilliam, 1960)

11. Walter Stace, Time and Eternity, (Princeton University Press, 1952)

12. This notion of a mystical experience containing self-contradictions is best represented by the apophatic description of mystical experience. Phrases such as "it was like X but not like X" typify such descriptions. Perhaps the most well known of the apophatic descriptions is The Cloud of Unknowing The importance this point will become known shortly.

13. Richard Gale, "Mysticism and Philosophy" p. 115.

14. Julian of Norwich claims, on her death bed, "I desired to suffer with him [Jesus], living in my body, as God would give me grace." Julian of Norwich, Showings, ed. James Walsh (Paulist, 1978), p.129. Teresa of Avila states, "He [Jesus] bade me to not suppose that He had forgotten me, but it was necessary that I should do all that I could myself....[He] said to me very often: 'Thou art mine, and I am thine.'" Teresa of Avila, The Life of Teresa of Avila, tr. D. Lewis, p 402

15. William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, {Cornell, 1991) p.25.

16. Catherine of Siena and Gregory of Nyssa are good examples here. Both play on the imagery of Jesus as the bridegroom and the mystic as the bride.

17. William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, {Cornell, 1991) p. 9.

18. To explore this point more clearly, Chapter One of Alston's book covers a number of experiences given by mystics which make clear the ties between mystical experience and common experience, mystical perception and sensual perception. Another claim supporting this point is made in Steven Katz's "The Conservative Character of Mystical Experience" Mysticism and Religious Traditions, (Oxford, 1983), p.14, where he writes, "The concrete meetings of mystic and beloved in Christian tradition, moreover, are almost always with the Christ whose physical body and wounds, etc., are seen and felt by the Christian initiate. Indeed, this feeling of sharing in Christ's wounds is a common feature of many Christian Mystical occasions."

19. Richard Gale, "Mysticism and Philosophy" p. 115.

20. Steven Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," in Mysticism and Philosophy, (Oxford, 1978), p. 55. Katz actually makes this point about the paradoxical nature of mystical experience, but it should be apparent that this should apply to ineffable as well.

21. Taken from William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience, {Cornell, 1991] p.32.

22. For several more examples of mystical experiences of this type see the pages following 32 presented by Alston. Most of them do not share one characteristic of ineffability detailed here by Stace, even though the experiences are claimed to be ineffable.