What is Philosophy?
What is Philosophy?
A Debate Between Christopher Altieri and Mitch
Hodge
edited by Paul Rezendes
The question “What is Philosophy?” is more than a dry academic dispute. Posing the question is also to ask about the value and importance of philosophy itself. In this debate, Mitch Hodge and Chris Altieri tackle the question.
For purposes of this discussion, when Messrs. Altieri and Hodge refer to philosophy as a “science,” they are using the term in the older sense of a principled study of a subject matter by principles which is capable of providing knowledge. When Mr. Hodge later distinguishes philosophy from science, he is using the latter term in a narrower sense, closer to our modern and everyday usage.
Mr. Hodge begins discussion by questioning the adequacy of a direct translation of the Greek word “philosophia,” i.e., “love of wisdom,” as an answer, thereby beginning to define the scope of inquiry. He equates wisdom with knowledge, then shows that philosophers traffic in things other than knowledge, and do not necessarily love the subject of their work. - Ed.
Chris,
The straightforward translation of Philosophia from the Greek to the English “love of wisdom” fails to encompass what is needed as a definition of philosophy. My remarks here should be taken as an introductory background why another definition of philosophy should be tendered, and what that definition should be.
Many introductory texts offer 'love of wisdom' as the definition of the discipline of philosophy. Yet, such a definition fails to encompass the whole of what we now see philosophy becoming, and the subject matter of philosophy. If we do as Socrates and Theatetus [Plato, Theaetetus] and accept that wisdom is synonymous with knowledge, then immediately there is a problem. Much of what philosophy deals with is not knowledge in the traditional sense of justified, true belief, but merely justified belief. For instance, in philosophy of religion, both the philosophical theist and the atheist offer justification for their respective beliefs. Neither side claims to know that either God exists or does not exist based on philosophical evidence. There are other cases as well, such as the investigation into abstract universals by nominalist, realists, and tropists, and epistemology itself where the philosophers offer theories of knowledge and are not claiming to actually know what knowledge is. If we allow that wisdom is synonymous with knowledge, and therefore that philosophy is the 'love of knowledge,' then we find that philosophers spend little time dealing with what might be called knowledge under the traditional definition of justified, true belief.
There are other problems. First, is it really the case that a philosopher should love wisdom in order to practice philosophy? Let us consider the standpoint of the skeptic and the nihilist. Can it be said that either of these groups love wisdom? I guess, on some level of understanding, it could, but I think a strong case can be made that neither the nihilist nor the skeptic love wisdom, rather they deny or question wisdom. Here, we find that the offering of 'love of wisdom' again falls short because we have two groups of philosophers who can be said not to love wisdom, yet still practice philosophy.
Second, such a definition does little to describe the actions of one practicing philosophy. It is not the case that philosophers sit around adoring or admiring wisdom. What philosophers attempt to do, on the other hand is work at solving rational problems which relate to our understanding of the world in which we live. I have no doubt that this can often be a labour of love, but I do not take this to be a requirement to be a philosopher. If this were the case, then it would be the case that perhaps many of our most noted philosophers are wrongly accused of doing philosophy (consider Hume, and Reid for examples).
This is enough for us to at least question whether the 'love of wisdom' is an appropriate definition of philosophy and, at the most, as I have done, reject it as the definition altogether. Although there was a time in the beginnings of philosophy when such a definition was appropriate and fitting, considering the current practice of philosophy with all of its nuances, such a definition falls short of capturing the endeavors of the philosophers. And if the definition of the practice does not meet with the endeavors of the practitioners, then it should be obvious that the definition is insufficient.
Chris Altieri defends a definition closer to the literal translation by pointing out (1) that philosophy, in studying knowledge, rightly looks at other matters besides knowledge, (2) that “knowledge” is not synonymous with “wisdom” and (3) that philosophers who deny objective knowledge nevertheless still treat “knowledge” as their subject-matter. Ed.
Dear Mitch,
If I understand correctly, you have offered three reasons for rejecting the definition, "love of wisdom," as unacceptable, to wit:
I would like now to attempt a reconciliation among these problems and the definition of philosophy as, "love of wisdom." To this end, I will address the problems in the order presented above.
First, then, is the identification of wisdom with knowledge. You will argue that, since wisdom and knowledge are synonymous, and since philosophy is legitimately concerned with objects that are not knowledge (e.g. opinion), the definition, "love of wisdom," is unacceptable. You cite the Theaetetus to support the identification of knowledge and wisdom, but consider the way in which that which is not knowledge is treated within the Theaetetus. The Theaetetus is the founding work in epistemology, that branch of the science of philosophy that is concerned expressly with knowledge as such, and not with the different kinds of knowledge, still less with objects thereof. Thus, I should like to turn our attention to 146e7, where Socrates is seen to say, "But that is not what you were asked, Theaetetus. You were not asked to say what one may have knowledge of, or how many branches of knowledge there are. It was not with any idea of counting these up that the question was asked; we wanted to know what knowledge itself is."
Plato, through Socrates, makes it quite clear that love of knowledge is not synonymous with, and therefore not reducible to the sundry objects of knowledge. Thus, consideration of opinion is not only admissible, but central to the loving pursuit of knowledge as such. Further, it is impossible to consider opinion qua opinion, or under itself, since opinion is defined as that which is not knowledge. Thus, opinion, conjecture, etc., are all considered legitimately by the philosopher when the philosopher considers them qua knowledge.
In addition, the identification of wisdom with knowledge is neither universally accepted nor historically consistent. St. Augustine of Hippo argues in the De Civitate Dei IX.xxi, that, "In the Demons, then, there is Knowledge without Charity." Further, that men, "who resemble the demons in pride but not in knowledge," cannot attain true wisdom on account of their pride, which loves itself more than the truth. Men, in loving wisdom, which is not knowledge, but knowledge informed with Charity, practice philosophy. Those who, full of pride, seek knowledge, will find neither knowledge nor wisdom, but only ruin and suffering.
One might object that Augustine, in speaking of the angels, prescinds from philosophy. It is to be remembered, however, that Augustine is responding to the neo-platonists. Further, and most importantly, it is not necessary that one believe in angels in order to countenance or even accept the distinction that Augustine is making between knowledge and wisdom. Indeed, his distinction seems even today to be worthy of attention, and dominated Western thought for over a thousand years. Neitzche himself devoted a considerable amount of his short life to the debunking of charity, and one such as he, though open to many accusations, was not known for swinging at shadows.
As for your second objection: The skeptic does not deny wisdom as such, but has serious doubts concerning its attainability. Even the skeptic, in admitting of every statement he makes, "I could be wrong," indicates the alternative, and as such does not say anything about actual states-of-affairs, but only about the accessibility of those same to the human being. There is a talking point: Skepticism does not necessitate a repudiation of knowledge as such as an object of pursuit, but questions its attainability. Nihilists, on the other hand, do not argue that there is no such thing as truth, but that truth is something that is man-made. Thus, for the nihilist, the philosophical project becomes one of, "truth-making." This understanding of philosophy, while different from the strict 'love of wisdom', is not exclusive of it. In fact, it would suggest that philosophy is a labor of love that is wrapped up in the making of loveable thoughts. Nihilism is not resistant to classification under that definition of philosophy.
Finally, we come to your last objection. I am not entirely sure how to handle this, for the objection itself seems to be another definition of philosophy altogether [i.e., the solving of rational problems that relate to our understanding of the world in which we live]. If it is this, then I will be forced simply to say, "fine."
Hume and Reid are offered as proponents of this conception of philosophy, and so I will take that as a hint. Hume spends much of his Enquiry [Concerning Human Understanding] tearing down the epistemological foundations upon which the legitimacy of metaphysical and (sacred) theological inquiry was formerly based. The success or failure of his enterprise will determine the status of metaphysics and what has come to be called Philosophy of Religion. We certainly do not want to say that Hume is not a philosopher, and are equally concerned for the safety of metaphysics and philosophical theology. Thus, we are forced to reject this new definition and somehow save Hume. Hume may be saved by reference to the reply I made to the first objection. Wisdom being claimed by no philosopher, it cannot be qualified or limited by any one object. Hume is free to conduct his philosophical inquiries within the visible, phenomenal world and to confine it there. He is free to claim that the visible, phenomenal realm is the only one worth investigating. Even accepting all this, however, one is not therefore forced to say that our friend from Konigsburg is full of nonsense.
Mr. Hodge’s reply moves the debate to a new area. He first points out the philosophical disagreements concerning what counts as “wisdom.” He then distinguishes philosophy from other sciences: philosophy, unlike other sciences, takes itself and the sciences themselves as part of its own subject of inquiry.
Mr. Hodge’s point here is quite Platonic: one is reminded of Socrates’ argument to Thrasymachus in Republic, Book I, that sciences do not take as their goal their own improvement, but only the improvement of their subject-matter (e.g., shepherding improves sheep, not shepherding).
Once again, the reader is cautioned to ask whether the assumption is correct: is it really true that it is no business of science to ask whether a particular theory counts as “science,” or to improve the science itself? Don’t physicists attempt to improve their own science? Is that really something left only to philosophers? If philosophy and science are distinct in this regard, can we continue to consider philosophy as a “science”? If the distinction can be maintained, are philosophy and the sciences nonetheless in a necessarily symbiotic relationship? Can one analyze the abstractions of science and other fields of knowledge without engaging the substance of the field of knowledge? Plato raises this and other issues, and takes up in greater detail the notion of a “science of itself and other sciences” in the “Charmides,” to which the reader is also referred.
-- Ed.
Chris,
What is at stake here is the very content of philosophy, and why it is that philosophy is recognized as a science. What struck me in the discussion, and especially in the special care which you took to point our previous philosophers ponderings on the subject, was that philosophy is perhaps the only science which has itself as a subject, that is-- unlike the natural or social sciences, philosophy seeks still to define and study itself. What is even more striking is that philosophy also has as its subject all of the other natural and social sciences. I will return to this a little later.
What stands out in your response is the same reason in which I think the definition of philosophy as the "love of wisdom" is insufficient. The discussions of Plato (through Socrates), Hume and St. Augustine all manifest the same basic problem, that is, philosophers [ancient and modern] are unsure what wisdom means whether in the ponderings of Theatetus about the correlation between knowledge and wisdom, or St. Augustine's insistence that knowledge must be coupled with charity to achieve wisdom, or Hume's epistemological investigations which bring many of the topics of traditional philosophy into question, and as such would relegate wisdom, as understood by Augustine, to the extinguished flame of metaphysics. For me, it seems strange that a discipline as old and as stringent as philosophy would still be grappling with the very basis of its endeavor. This is the gut feeling which causes me to assert that philosophy is not the love of wisdom.
I return to the previous paragraph where I mused about the fact that philosophy not only has itself as its topic, but the natural and social sciences as well. What is interesting here, is that if a physicist was to ponder the nature of causation, he would no longer be practicing physics as a natural science, but rather engaging in the philosophy of science. In the same manner, if an anthropologist where to ponder about his discipline, and the nature of humanity, he would no longer be practicing anthropology (in that it is an empirical science), but rather what might be roughly referred to as metaethics, or ethics proper (depending on the depth of his inquiry). Yet, if a philosopher questions philosophy itself, he is still within the domain of philosophy. Why is it that philosophy seems to stand apart from the other scientific disciplines in such a way? This is an interesting question indeed, and perhaps it will point us in the direction in which we should next lead the debate.
This overlap between philosophy and the natural and social sciences has not escaped notice before. In his short work, What Philosophy Is, Arthur Danto extracts this relationship, and comments "Philosophy is the disciplines of disciplines" (p. 10). Yet, what further begs for extraction is exactly why it is so that philosophy can encompass these disciplines, but not be those disciplines, save the inquiry into philosophy itself. Here, I think the answer is straightforward. The natural and social sciences have as their subject matter empirical evidence. This means that their domain is concrete particulars. Inasmuch as abstraction (as in theory) is a part of the discipline, the abstraction itself is not the subject of investigation, but rather used to explain the existence of the concrete particular. If it is the case that the abstraction itself is put to inquiry, the investigation of the respective discipline becomes philosophical.
This of course brings me to what in the next section of the debate I will offer and defend as the definition of philosophy. It is this special investigation of abstraction which I think is the object of the discipline, and what allows philosophy not only to birth the other sciences, but continue to bring them to task. I will, of course, have to clarify what it is that I mean by abstraction, and support why it is that I think it is the subject of philosophy alone. At this point, however, I think it prudent to await your counsel and comments.
Mr. Altieri continues down the path opened by Mr. Hodge, that is, treating philosophy as in some sense a study of studies. He disagrees, however, about limiting the study of philosophy to the study of a single “object” such as “abstraction.” Mr. Altieri’s presentation, in turn, raises a number of questions. This path of the discussion started with the observation that philosophy has itself as one of its objects of study. To what extent has Mr. Altieri remained true to this original observation by treating philosophy as the study of other studies? What is the connection between Mr. Altieri’s saying that philosophy is the study of other studies and his agreement that philosophy studies “in abstraction”? -- Ed.
Dear Mitch,
The strength of your argument as I see it lay in the fact that you understand philosophy as a discipline that studies itself without losing its definitive character- indeed, that philosophy is not only a science but the science of science precisely because it can and does consider itself. Still, to call philosophy, "the science of science," is to introduce surreptitiously a definition without grounding it (unless you will grant it its ground in our correspondence for the sake of the argument, and I do not think that either of us would desire that).
Where I see the difficulty is in your assertion, "What is at stake here is the very content of philosophy." I see the question "what is philosophy," to be a formal question primarily (if not exclusively- and here I think there is a very good discussion to be had).
The fact that you admit Plato, Aristotle, Theataetus and Augustine as legitimate philosophers is evidence of this. They all treat of the same stuff- i.e. the world and its principles, causes and ends, and man's place therein and therefore, his own principles, causes and ends. Therefore, the content of philosophy is not in question, rather, their very status as philosophers has not to do with what they treat, but how they treat of it.
Given this, I must admit that I find your assertion that, "It is this special investigation of abstraction which I think is the object of the discipline," to be very attractive.
I begin with a quotation from William James' Principles of Psychology: "What is a Natural Science to begin with? It is a mere fragment of truth broken out from the whole mass of it for the sake of practical effectiveness exclusively. Divide et impera. Every special science, in order to get at its own particulars at all, must make a number of convenient assumptions and decline to be responsible for questions which the human mind will continue to ask about them. Thus physics assumes a material world, but never tries to show how our experience of such a world is, 'possible.' It assumes the inter-action of bodies, and the completion by them of continuous changes, without pretending to know how such results can be.(James, W., Principles of Psychology p. iii; Works Edition, Cambridge, Ma., 1981)
This quote adequately represents your presentation of the difference between philosophy and the natural sciences. No natural science can have itself as its object- but to have itself as its object is not, quite obviously, to study the object of its inquiry. To study an object of inquiry is to be a science (when the inquiry is conducted scientifically, i.e. according to principles). Rather, to have itself as its object is to study the principles upon which such a study is founded and within which it is conducted. It is a formal investigation.
Physics, for example, must assume causation in order to be physics at all. The physicist does not concern himself with the nature of causation, at least not qua physicist. The validity of physics, or of any natural science, for that matter, is not to be found within the science proper.
The philosopher, on the other hand, works within the province of principle, and it is emphatically his, and his alone. The one principle governing philosophy is reason, which does not consist in anything but itself. What the philosopher does, i.e. philosophy, is not to examine the "what" of a natural science (the what of physics being the examination of causal relationships among bodies in motion), but to examine how a natural science does what it does.
Further, when you point out that the philosopher, in questioning what it is that he does, does not prescind but rather enters more deeply into philosophy, you seem to make my point for me. The reason for which Hume seeks to commit metaphysics and theology to the flames is because they do not qualify as sciences- they do not concern themselves with observation, the only valid scientific principle- the only principle upon which science might legitimately be based and within which science may be conducted.
Thus, Kant, in order to save metaphysics and, most importantly, ethics, which he rightly saw as being threatened by Hume's understanding of what science is, did not seek to show how esse qua esse can be observed (which he knew to be a futile task), but to question the very principle of observation and to investigate its possibilities, showing that observation itself is dependent upon and conditioned by the unobservable and even inaccessible.
Thus, we are not concerned with the "stuff" of philosophy, but with what philosophy is, i.e. what does philosophy look like to the mind's eye? If we limit our definition of philosophy to an investigation of abstraction, we tie our science to an object in a way that is repugnant to its very universality - its ability and its duty to examine everything.
I am willing to concede that the philosopher considers all things in abstraction, as long as we are very clear as to what that means (and I confess that I am not quite sure, myself), and so long as we recognize that to make such as concession is only to agree on an epistemological point.
Mr. Hodge continues the discussion by arguing that philosophy and [other] sciences are in fact distinguished by the object of their inquiry. He then discusses what he means by philosophy having abstraction as its object. Philosophy investigates abstractions and universals; mathematics does so also, but is different from philosophy in that it investigates quantity rather than quality. Thus, Mr. Hodge’s complete definition of philosophy is: the qualitative analysis of abstractions and universals. This definition, he suggests, avoids many of the common objections about philosophy.
The reader should continue to ask probing questions. What does Mr. Hodge mean by “qualitative analysis” and how does this differ from what mathematics does at high levels of abstraction? Consider, for instance, Godel’s proof, which purported to prove that it is impossible to demonstrate the completeness of any formal system. Is that a quantitative result, or a qualitative one? And is it true that science has as its object only concrete particulars? Does the theory of relativity’s postulation of curved space, and re-construction of the force of gravity as a curvature in the space-time continuum rather than a ghostly form of action-at-a-distance focus on concrete particulars or instead the abstract notions, the concepts themselves, of gravity, space and time? Does quantum mechanic’s re-conceptualization of physical reality as the overlay of multiple possibilities instead of as a single definite material state treat of concrete particulars only, or does it go to our basic abstract notions of being? -- Ed.
Chris,
Because we are thinking along similar lines, I will only make a cursory comment on your last response, and then proceed with what I think abstraction is, why it is the task of philosophy, and then proffer my definition of philosophy followed by a few closing remarks.
You assert that "we are not concerned with the ‘stuff’ of philosophy, but with what philosophy is." I think this is where our major difference of opinion lies in these matters. Whereas you seem to think that philosophy can be separated from what it investigates, I, on the other hand think that is precisely what contributes to a useful definition of philosophy. You further claim that philosophy has the ability and duty to investigate everything. Here too, I think there is a difference. As you and I both seem to agree, there is something which separates a physicist's investigation of the world and the philosopher's investigation. I take you to be claiming that a physicist who ponders the nature of causation is doing philosophy, and that a philosopher can investigate the proper domain of physics (i.e. figure the velocity of a projectile) and still be doing philosophy. I disagree. I do not think that physics is a subset of philosophy, only some of the questions about the subject matter of physics are. Thus the philosopher, when engaging in the science of physics, is doing physics and not philosophy. I say this knowing full well that physics was birthed from philosophy.
There is an acknowledged difference between a physical investigation and a philosophical one. It is precisely this "stuff" on which I seek to properly found a suitable definition of philosophy. The question then becomes, "what is it that properly sets a philosophical investigation apart from the investigations of the natural sciences?" Here, I think the answer is becoming more evident considering our previous discussions. I introduced in my last essay the notion that the philosopher deals with abstraction; you agreed with this as an epistemological point. I think that this is ample headway to proceed.
You rightly point out that “abstraction” is an ambiguous term. If I were to place “abstraction” into the definition of philosophy, I would be rightly accused of replacing two ambiguous terms from the traditional definition with one. This word "abstraction" deserves closer examination and clarification.
When we speak abstractly, what are we doing? Hegel's paper, "Who Thinks Abstractly?" comes to mind. In the work, he describes how it is that villagers are able to abstract from a man being sentenced for a crime that he is a murderer. Here, there is one attribute of the man which is being abstracted from his being. So, if we accept this from Hegel, then philosophy is concerned with attributes which are abstracted from being. This gives us a clue to our endeavor. (I should affirm that it is not the philosopher which Hegel thinks is the abstract thinker, but the masses; a true irony as I see it)
Now, if we are to say that philosophy deals with abstractions from being, then it might be protested that ontology, a proper branch of philosophy, deals with being qua being and that our definition is faulty because it is under inclusive. So let us look further to see as to whether it is fatal. When a philosopher investigates being, it is not a particular being with which he concerns himself most rightly (save the case of God which I will address shortly). It is being in the universal sense. For instance a rock and a human are both said to have being. So, what makes being an interesting case is that it can be ascribed to more than one particular at the same time, and further, it itself exists in more than one place at the same time. Given this information, we might rightly say that an investigation into being qua being is an investigation into an abstract universal (that which is able to exist in more than one place at the same time, vis-a-vis Aristotle).
So, now we have that philosophy itself concerns itself with the investigations of abstractions and universals. In other words, philosophy is not concerned with concrete particulars (which are the domain of the natural sciences). The proper questions of philosophy then must deal with questions of abstraction or universality. From this, if we use the categories of metaphysics to state what is within the domains of abstraction and universality, we have abstract particulars (tropes), abstract universals (what is commonly just called universals), and concrete universals (God).
Here, it might quickly be rebutted, "What of the nominalist? He holds and defends that all that really exists is concrete particulars. Surely, you are not claiming that a nominalist is not a philosopher." And most certainly I do not want to deny that a nominalist is a philosopher! What is clear from a nominalist’s investigations of concrete particulars, however, is that he deals with these concrete particulars in the abstract; in other words, what all concrete particulars have in common is that they are all concrete particulars. He deals with 'concrete particular' as if it were an abstract so that he can speak of all which exists. He does not, nor must he, limit is investigation to each and every concrete particular separately to defend his physical philosophy. Therefore the nominalist, though he believes that only concrete particulars exists, deals with concrete particulars in the abstract. Thus, even though the nominalist does not believe that abstract universals exist, he must so treat concrete particulars as abstract universals to describe his philosophy. This does not mean that he accepts that abstract universals exist, it just means that his philosophical inquiry forces him to speak of them as if they do.
So, if we accept that concrete particulars are the proper domain of the natural sciences, and not of philosophy, then we may proceed and say that philosophy is concerned with abstraction and universality in the forms of abstract particulars, abstract universals, and concrete universals. Here an obvious rebuttal might be that my definition, while it does serve to separate philosophy from the natural sciences, it does not separate it from mathematics which deals with abstract universals (numbers). Such a critique would be quite correct. So, then what is it that would separate philosophy from mathematics?
Here, I think that the difference between the methodologies is what is crucial. Briefly, mathematics is concerned with quantity, whereas philosophy is concerned with quality. Where as mathematics sees the number one as a quantity, philosophy might assign other attributes to the number such as unity, individuality, or singleness. So, what philosophy is thus concerned with is not the quantity of the abstract universal, but rather the quality; and here we have another important piece of the puzzle.
So, philosophy then is not merely concerned with abstraction and universals, but it concerned with the qualities of the same. This is truly telling, and allows us to the final step of formulating our definition. Philosophy then, is the qualitative analysis of abstractions and universals.
This definition of philosophy is expansive enough to cover the whole of the philosophical enterprise, but also exclusive enough to separate philosophy from other disciplines. There is also a precision in the definition which allows for what many think is the fostering ground for any philosophical endeavor, metaphysics. Metaphysics specifically is concerned with the nature of abstraction and universality. Yet, the analysis of both abstractions and universals allow for the definition to encompass the specific topic of being in ontology, and the moral abstractions found in ethics. Yet, at the same time the analysis of abstractions and universals exclude the natural sciences from philosophy, and philosophy from them. Further, it is the case that it is a qualitative analysis separates philosophy from mathematics. So, it seems that we have with satisfaction found our suitable definition of philosophy.
I suppose at this point I should address why I think that this definition should be accepted over the traditional definition of "love of wisdom". Without rehashing all that on which I have previously commented, I wish to add a few closing comments on this subject.
It is no secret to philosophers that our discipline is constantly under attack by both laypersons and professionals from other fields. Laypersons feel that philosophy has lost touch with the common man, and professionals in other fields believe that philosophers only coyly use the title to invade other disciplines without the specific training to be a professional in the field attacked. So much so, there is a growing trend with people to believe that philosophy is a useless and defunct discipline in this age. If we, and the others, believe that philosophy truly is the "love of wisdom", then we might seriously need to take these criticisms to heart. For surely, philosophy is not wise if it is not understood by all, and there is no love of wisdom if philosophy only serves to invade areas of wisdom. Moreover, there is a tendency of laypeople who only know of philosophy as the love of wisdom to think that a philosopher is a cross between Jesus, Buddha, and Timothy Leary. In short, there is a tendency to rank a philosopher as a guru rather than a practitioner of a science.
Further, while I would not deny that a philosopher loves wisdom, I think that is more of an added quality of the philosopher which is shared by many other fields, I think that such a definition serves to underestimate philosophy as a rational science, and fosters misunderstanding by those outside the science. Philosophy does have a specific methodology, that of qualitative analysis, and specific topics of study, that of abstractions and universals. By thus defining philosophy, philosophy itself serves to benefit in the eyes of its critics, and reestabish itself as a valued discipline. Though it is certainly beyond the scope of this debate to address the benefits which philosophy provides, I believe those benefits would be more readily received if they were looked upon as a contribution from a science rather than the ejaculation from an orgy of thought.
It is indeed because I love philosophy that I offer this definition. It is my desire that others rightfully know to what it is I have devoted my life; why I think it is important, and why the discipline should not be overlooked and shirked. Moreover, it should not be viewed as unproductive nor the "lazy man's science". Philosophy indeed serves a purpose which makes all other forms of investigations possible, yet if we are only known as those who love wisdom, this fact may never be communicated. However, as those who perform the qualitative analysis of abstraction and universals, we have a clear cut service and purpose in under girding any wisdom which science may provide.
Mr. Altieri concludes this portion of the discussion by further developing the notion that his definition of philosophy is formal, rather than substantive, focused on something other than the subject-matter (or “object”) of its inquiry. His concluding essay demonstrates some fundamental issues on which he and Mr. Hodge agree. Both are committed to treating philosophy as in some way privileged to address other areas of inquiry, and as treating something about those areas which is missed by the disciplines which we normally consider as having those fields as their subject.
The essay leaves some questions unanswered. By way of some examples: How does philosophy have itself as its own subject matter? Why is it that science needs some “grounding” other than itself? What does it mean to have or to provide that “grounding” and how does philosophy provide it? We can only look forward to the debate between Messrs. Hodge and Altieri in the Live Lecture Hall and hope that some of these additional questions will be answered.
Dear Mitch,
You begin with what I recognize as the most difficult of the points that I am trying to make. It seems to me to be the cardinal point of our discussion, as you yourself acknowledge. Therefore, I will attempt to clarify it and to draw it out further. Without pretending to exhaustively demonstrate it, I think that, if I can make it to stand on its own two feet, then I shall have done my work.
When I say that we are not, or ought not, to be interested in the, "stuff" of philosophy, but in what philosophy is, I do not intend to separate philosophy from its subject matter. To do so would be, as you suggest, to speak about nothing. I do believe, however, that we have a formal question at hand. We are agreed that we do not know what wisdom is, or even what it might look like, and so, even if we were to posit philosophy as "love of wisdom," we would be saying very little about its subject-matter.
It is from there that I begin. I do not see the "love of wisdom," as a substantial, but a formal definition. That this is so is evidenced by the fact that, as we agree, philosophy has as its legitimate and proper subject-matter all of the natural and social sciences. It also has itself as its subject. Without going immediately into a binding discussion about how philosophy has itself as a subject (I will get into that later), it is important that we remember how philosophy has the natural and social sciences as its subject-matter.
We know that philosophy is not concerned with the subject-matter of the individual natural and social sciences (although when speaking of the social sciences, the distinction can seem blurry, but only at a distance- I only make a note en passant, and do not intend to open that can o' worms!), but with the sciences themselves. This means that, as you and I both indicate in other missives, the physicist does not study causation, he accepts it in order to study other things, and has no interest in explaining how the observation of physical phenomena on which he bases the practice of his science might be possible. The philosopher investigates the principles upon which the various natural and social sciences are founded- causality, observation, logical consequence (in the formation of hypotheses), more (experimental/empirical)observation, and most of all with conclusions, for it is philosophy and philosophy alone that can provide the ground and basis for the validity of the conclusions that are drawn by the natural and social sciences. As such, philosophy does not separate the natural sciences from their subject matter. Rather, philosophy seeks, through investigation into the principles of the natural and social sciences, to assure that they are legitimately connected to their supposed subject-matter.
I do not see why there ought to be a difference in philosophy's treatment of itself. By investigating its own principles, it constantly re-evaluates itself, re-invents itself, searching constantly for better, clearer and more certain ways of approaching the whole of experience, the whole of thought, the whole of knowledge, in sum, the whole world. It is precisely because philosophy has everything as its legitimate subject-matter that it is either useless or frivolous to define philosophy substantially, i.e. according to its subject matter.
That having been said, I would like to suggest that even your definition, "the qualitative analysis of universals," whatever it might be worth and however it might be valid, is not a substantial but a formal definition. That this is the case is evidenced by the fact that, as you say of the nominalist, "Thus the nominalist, even though he believes that concrete particulars are all that exist, deals with concrete particulars in the abstract. Thus, even though the nominalist does not believe that abstract universals exist, he must so treat concrete particulars as abstract universals in order to describe his philosophy." What this statement (which I think is correct) means is that the employment of abstract universals is not a description of substance, but a description of the form under which any subject of philosophical investigation must be treated. Thus, to say that philosophy is the qualitative analysis of universals is not to pronounce on that of which philosophy treats, but to pronounce on how philosophy treats of what it treats, i.e. universally.
I think that, at having come thus far, the point is either made or not. Indeed, that is to be further settled in the debate. Clearly, the objections and counter-cases are in place, and we are ready to proceed to our debate.
On a soon to be announed date, Hodge and Altieri will be continuing their debate in the Live Lecture Hall here at The Examined Life. There will be time for questions and answers at the end. There will also be a moderated discussion on the question, "What is philosophy?" in the Live Lecture Hall. To see a schedule of these events, go here.
If you would like to participate in the debate, but are unable to attend the discussion, then you are welcome to post your comments on The Examined Life Philosophy Discussion Forum.
Mr. Christopher Rudden Altieri is a graduate student focusing on Augustinian philosophy at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, Italy. He received his Ph. B. in 1998, and will receive his Ph. L. pending a final oral examination in June of this year. His Ph. D. canidacy was requested in January.
Mr. K. M. "Mitch" Hodge is a graduate student, philosopher, classicist, and executive editor of The Examined Life On-Line Philosophy Journal. He may be contacted through the journal at theeditor@theexaminedlife.every1.net
Paul Rezendes is a practicing lawyer and amateur philosopher who received his BA in philosophy in 1978. His interests in law and philosophy came together in his article "Professionals As Attorneys: Are Lawyers Ethically Unique?" published in Volume 3, Numbers 3 & 4, Fall/Winter 1994 of The Journal Professional Ethics.
